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Summary 
A perceived lack of coordination in the federal government's warning 
notification process and inconsistent messages regarding threats to the homeland 
have led to an erosion of confidence in the information conveyed to the Nation. 
Congress is now considering legislation (H.R. 18 17, The Department of Homeland 
Security Authorization Act for FY2006) to reform the Homeland Security Advisor 
System to allow for greater confidence in the threat information conveyed to the 
Nation. 
Since September 1 1, 200 1, numerous federal government organizations have 
notified the public of threats to the Nation. At times, warnings have been issued in 
a government-wide coordinated manner; other times this has not been the case. In 
each situation that has led to increasing the threat level, a number of organizations 
have made public pronouncements regarding the nature of the threat prior to, during, 
or after the raising of the alert-level. The information conveyed to the public often 
has been inconsistent regarding the threat or the timing of a suspected attack. This 
lack of coordination and unity in message has led to a dilution in the American 
public's belief in the pronouncements and a questioning of the utility of the 
Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS). The focus of this paper is the federal 
government's coordination efforts in publicly alerting the Nation of threats to the 
homeland. The report reviews past warnings and changes in the alert level, 
organizations that have made public statements regarding threats to the Nation, and 
examples of how this lack of unity might lead to confusion and misinterpretations of 
the threat level. Options for Congress are provided regarding delineation of roles and 
responsibilities and which government entity should be held accountable for warning 
the Nation of threats to the homeland . 
This paper may be updated based on future National threat notifications or 
changes in the notification system. For a discussion and options regarding the 
Homeland Security Advisory System's (HSAS) level of detail with respect to 
disseminated warnings, Department of Homeland Security's suggested protective 
measures, coordination of the HSAS with other current federal warning systems, or 
the costs associated with threat levels changes see CRS Report RL32023, Homeland 
Security Advisory System: Possible Issues for Congressional Oversight. 
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Issues Concerning the Nationwide Threat 
Notification System 
A perceived lack of coordination in the federal government's warning 
notification process and inconsistent messages regarding threats to the homeland 
have led to an erosion of confidence in the information conveyed to the Nation. 
Congress is now considering legislation (H.R. 18 17, The Department of Homeland 
Security Authorization Act for FY2006) to reform the Homeland Security Advisor 
System to assure greater confidence in the threat information being conveyed to the 
Nation. A universally understandable, consistent, and reliable national threat 
notification system is deemed necessary in today's world of increasing and time- 
sensitive threats to the Nation. Many believe that the notification of a threat to the 
United States should be conveyed by a single entity and the message should be 
consistent with other communications federal government officials may offer. In 
times of crisis or national emergency, the federal government's unity of message and 
a coordinated delivery of the threat notification are widely seen as crucial to the 
effectiveness of the system designed to convey the message. "The System's color- 
coded warnings have become the primary means by which the federal Government 
communicates directly to the public its bottom-line judgment on the risk of terrorist 
attack at any given time."' However, the circumstances and explanations 
surrounding the warnings and changes in the Homeland Security Advisory System's 
(HSAS) color code to date have called into question the utility and credibility of the 
system. In particular: 
0 At times it appears the color-code has been raised based on 
speculation that a terrorist attack may occur rather than receipt of 
new threat information; 
0 At other times, warnings of heightened threats have been issued 
without changing the HSAS; and 
On numerous occasions agencies have provided different, and 
sometimes contradictory, information about threats to the homeland. 
House Holncidnd Jecullty Colwn~ttee Cnairrnan illrratopher Cox, h ul1 Corlumttee Hears 
Testimony Regarding the Homeland Security Advisory System; US. House of 
Representatives Committee on Homeland Security, February 4,2004. 
Threat Notification Responsibility 
On March 11, 2002, the President signed Homeland Security Presidential 
Directive-3 (HSPD-3) and created the HSAS (See Figure 1). This Directive gave 
responsibility to the Attorney General to administer and make public announcements 
regarding threats to the Nation.* Subsequent of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, 
enacted November 25,2002, provided that the Under Secretary of the Infrastructure 
Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (IAIP) Directorate, subject to the direction and 
control of the Secretary (of Homeland Security), shall administer the Homeland 
Security Advisory System (HSAS), including (1) exercising primary responsibility 
for public advisories related to threats to homeland security (2) in coordination with 
other agencies of the Federal Government, providing specific warning information 
to State and local government agencies and authorities, the private sector, other 
entities, and the p ~ b l i c . ~  
Figure 1. HSAS 
"The decision whether to publicly announce Threat Conditions shall be made on a case-by- 
case basis by the Attorney General in consultation with the Assistant to the President for 
Homeland Security. Every effort shall be made to share as much information regarding the 
threat as possible, consistent with the safety of the Nation. The Attorney General shall 
ensure, consistent with the safety of the Nation, that State and local government officials and 
law enforcement authorities are provided the most relevant and timely information. The 
Attorney General shall be responsible for identifying any other information developed in the 
threat assessment process that would be useful to State and local officials and others and 
conveying it to them as permitted consistent with the constraints of classification. The 
Attorney General shall establish a process and a system for conveying relevant information 
to Federal, State, and local govement  officials, law enforcement authorities, and the 
private sector expeditiously." 
PL 107-296; Sect 201(d)(7). Homeland Security Act of 2002. 
Though the Homeland Security Act of 2002 is fairly clear regarding the 
transition of responsibility of administering a national threat notification system from 
the Attorney General to the Secretary of Homeland Security, there reportedly have 
been "a few occasions in the past couple of years that Secretary Ridge was frustrated 
when Attorney General Ashcroft announced terrorist threat information, despite the 
fact that the Homeland Security Act of 2002, transferred the responsibility of 
management of the HSAS from DOJ to DHS. Also at times, DHS has disagreed with 
the alarming tone of Ashcroft's  announcement^."^ This paper will discuss examples 
of uncoordinated national threat announcements between DHS, DOJ, and other 
federal government entities. It is possible that recent changes of Departmental and 
Agency leadership may assist in resolving future occurrences of uncoordinated and 
premature threat announcements. However, the issue remains that previous threat 
announcements and arguably a lack of discernible processes in determining from 
whom threat information is to be conveyed, has seriously eroded the HSAS's 
credibility generating congressional review and discussion of ways to approach future 
national threat warning efforts. 
Threat Notifications Chronology 
0 September 11 - September 24, 2002 
First time the threat-level is raised from Yellow-Elevated (Significant Risk 
of Terrorist Attack) to Orange-High (High Risk of Terrorist Attack) 
Pursuant to the responsibility given to the Attorney General and delineated in 
HSPD-3, Attorney General Ashcroft announced on September 11,2002, that "the 
U.S. intelligence community has received information, based on the debriefing of a 
senior A1 Qaeda operative, of possible terrorist attacks timed to coincide with the 
anniversary of the September 11 attacks on the United States." However, one-week 
prior to the official notice put forth by the Attorney General, Office of Homeland 
Security Chief Tom Ridge reportedly stated that "U.S. officials do not have 
intelligence indicating terrorists are plotting another attack on the September 1 1 th 
anniversary. We do not anticipate raising the threat level for that day."5 Though it 
is common in the world of intelligence to receive information that contradicts 
previous analysis, possibly explaining moving from an elevated (yellow) to a high 
threat (orange) environment in one-week's time, the concern is that prior to the first 
use of the HSAS, two senior members of the Administration spoke publicly to the 
status of the threat environment. In this case the Director of the Office of Homeland 
Security seemed to have preempted the Attorney General's responsibility to publicly 
announce information regarding the threat environment and the status of the HSAS. 
John Mintz, "Chertoff Orders Agency Review, Changes Possible, DHS Chief Says," 
W q r l i  jvgfr77 Pnrf .  ?Isyc$ 17. 2 0 0 .  421 
"Ridge Sees No Hint of New 911 11 Raid," The Sun Diego Union-Tribune, September 4, 
2002. 
The following two items review instances where threat information of a signijkant 
nature was discussed by senior Administration officials in an open forum. These 
instances did not result in a change of the HSAS. 
On October 17, 2002, Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) Tenet stated 
before a joint session of the House and Senate Intelligence Committees, "You must 
make the assumption that A1 Qaeda is in an execution phase and intends to strike us 
both here and overseas. That's unambiguous as far as I am ~oncerned."~ 
On November 15,2002, the FBI stated, "Sources suggest A1 Qaeda may favor 
spectacular attacks that meet several criteria: high symbolic value, mass casualties, 
severe damage to the U.S. economy and maximum psychological trauma."' Despite 
the tone of the warning, White House spokesman Scott McClellan said the national 
alert status would remain unchanged. 
Although the previous two examples did not represent official public 
announcements, the effect was the same in that both of these events were widely 
publicized. Both statements may have been analytically correct, however a 
potentially troublesome precedent was being set by senior officials offering diverging 
interpretations of the nation's threat environment in a public forum. 
February 7 - February 27,2003 
Second time the threat-level raised to Orange 
Prior to the raising of the alert level, the Homeland Security Act of 2002 had 
been enacted (November 11, 2002). The act provided that the Under Secretary of 
IAIP subject to the direction and control of the Secretary (of Homeland Security), 
shall administer the Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS). On February 7, 
2003, Secretary of Homeland Security Ridge announced that intelligence reports 
suggested that A1 Qaeda was planning attacks on apartment buildings, hotels, and 
other soft targek8 
In the week leading up to the issuance of this threat warning and during the 
twenty-day duration of this rise in the alert level, numerous Administration officials 
provided varying descriptions as to the level of specificity and immediacy of the 
threat. Homeland Security Secretary Ridge said a terrorist attack was unlikely one- 
week after Attorney General Ashcroft stated that there was an increased likelihood 
of an attack on the United States. During this same time-period DCI Tenet testified 
before Congress that the information that led to this threat alert was as specific as it 
has ever been.g Secretary Ridge also stated during this alert level change that the 
intelligence about a possible attack more often than not is vague, whereas Attorney 
"Tenet: A1 Qaida Set to Strike Again," Associated Press, October 17, 2002. 
' Posted on the FBI's website Friday, November 15, 2002. 
Homeland Security Threat Level Raised to Orange, February 7, 2003. 
[http:11www.whitehouse.gov1news/re1eases/2003102120030207-6.htm1] 
"Weighing the Risks of Terror, Snippets and Threads Can Sway Threat Index," The 
Washington Post, February 16,2003. 
General Ashcroft stated that specific intelligence was corroborated by multiple 
intelligence  source^.'^ 
On February 24,2003, in the waning days of this increased alert level, Attorney 
General Ashcroft stated that the threat of terrorist attack remained high and there 
were no plans to downgrade the Nation's alert level. Less than three days later, 
Secretary Ridge announced that the HSAS was being lowered to Yellow- Elevated. 
March 17 - April 11,2003 
Third time threat-level raised to Orange 
On March 17, 2003, Secretary of Homeland Security Ridge stated that 
Intelligence reports indicated A1 Qaeda would probably attempt to launch terrorist 
attacks against U.S. interests to defend Muslims and the Iraqi people. On the eve of 
the war in Iraq, Secretary Ridge informed the public that the terrorist threat level was 
being raised, not because of any new threatening intelligence, but because the war 
seemed likely to provoke a terrorist response in the U.S." 
Prior to the war in Iraq, numerous Administration officials including some at the 
CIA and FBI, and lawmakers believed that should the United States commence 
military operations in Iraq, terrorist attacks in the United States would be an 
inevitable cost of toppling Saddam Hussein.12 
In lowering the threat level on April 11, 2003, DHS released a statement that 
after an assessment of the threats by the intelligence community, the Department of 
Homeland Security had made the decision to lower the threat advisory level. Defense 
Secretary Rumsfeld later noted that "the Nation must remain vigilant and alert to the 
possibility A1 Qaeda or those sympathetic to their cause; as well as former Iraqi 
regime state agents, may attempt to conduct attacks against the United States."13 
This change of alert level status was accompanied by a continuing pattern of 
independent official announcements regarding possible threats to the Nation, 
including statements by the Secretary of Defense countering the reasoning used to 
lower the alert level: threats remain of an attack from a1 Qaeda or Iraqi 
sympathizers. l 4  
lo "Ridge: Attack Is Unlikely, Keep Duct Tape in Storage," Newsday, February 15,2003. 
'I "A Nation at War: Domestic Security; New Signs of Terror Not Evident," The New York Times, 
April 6 ,  2003. 
l 2  "A Nation at War: Domestic Security; New Signs of Terror Not Evident," The New York Times, 
April 6,  2003. 
l 3  "Terror Threat T elrel Dropped to Yellow: Faqinc~ of War in Traq Ci t~d ."  The Wovhincton 
Post, April 17, 2003. 
l 4  Ibid. 
0 May 20 - May 30,2003 
Fourth time threat-level raised to Orange 
On May 20,2003, the Department of Homeland Security announced that the 
United States intelligence community believed A1 Qaeda had entered an operational 
period worldwide, including plans to attack the United States 
On the morning of May 20, 2003 DHS Secretary Ridge appeared before the 
House Committee on Homeland Security and stated that "America had the terror 
networks off-balance and that we are much safer (as a Nation)". Later that day in a 
press conference held to announce raising the threat alert level, Secretary Ridge 
reportedly stated "in response to intelligence reports concerning anti-U.S. terrorist 
group intentions and the recent attacks in Saudi Arabia and M o r o c ~ o ' ~  we are raising 
the HSAS to Orange". "While there is not credible, specific information with respect 
to targets or method of attack, the use of tactics similar to those seen in recent 
terrorist attacks overseas include small arms equipped assault teams, large vehicle- 
borne improvised explosive devices, and suicide bombers."16 Simultaneous with this 
announcement, DHS Under Secretary for Border and Transportation Security Asa 
Hutchinson announced at a press conference on Capitol Hill that the alert level had 
been raised because "there is increased specificity in what we hear, but not 
necessarily in terms of the target."I7 
On the following day FBI Director Mueller stated that there was no specific 
information regarding potential targets or the timing of an attack. DOD Secretary 
Rumsfeld reportedly stated that same day that some A1 Qaeda leaders in Iran were 
plotting attacks.'' 
In this instance, a number of senior members of the Administration discussed 
the information considered in the raising of the alert level, and one of the Secretary 
of Homeland Security's principal deputies offered conflicting information regarding 
the specificity of that information. 
December 21,2003 -January 9,2004 
Fifth time threat-level raised to Orange 
On December 21,2003, Secretary of Homeland Security Ridge stated that the 
United States intelligence community had received a substantial increase in threat- 
related intelligence reports and that credible sources suggested the possibility of 
attacks against the homeland around the holiday season and beyond. "The 
information we have indicates that extremists abroad are anticipating near-term 
I S  "U.S. Less Vulnerable, but Terror Attacks Still Possible: Ridge," Agence France Presse, 
May 21,2003. 
l6 DHS Website, "Statement by Homeland Security Secretary Tom Ridge on Raising the 
Threat Level," May 20,2003. 
CNN, "United States Goes on Orange Alert," May 20,2003. 
I s  "Terror Alert Raised to High amid Fears Foreign Attacks Could Spread," The Associated 
Press, May 2 1,2003. 
attacks that they believe will either rival or exceed the attacks that occurred in New 
York and the Pentagon and the fields of Pennsylvania nearly two years ago."'9 
On numerous occasions since the inception of the HSAS a variety of senior 
government officials have been quoted saying that it may never be known if raising 
the alert level stopped a terrorist act from occurring. However, two days after the 
alert level was raised for the fifth time since its creation, the Secretary of Defense 
stated that "there's no question that there are any number of terrorist acts that were 
stopped prior to their actually oc~ur r ing . "~~  Also, six days after this HSAS threat 
level was lowered, the FBI Director stated that he did not foresee a time when the 
country could drop its guard and that "we probably will at some point in time have 
another attack."*' 
There were twopublic discussions in 2004 of threat information of a significant 
nature that produced some anxiety among U S .  citizens and frustration on the part 
of the Congress. Neither of the following instances resulted in a change of the HSAS. 
On March 24,2004, the FBI issued a threat advisory indicating that the Texas 
oil industry may have been targeted by terrorists. While DHS is statutorily 
responsible for public advisories relating to the announcement of homeland security 
threats, specifically as they pertain to alerting infrastructure owners and operators of 
threat related information, the advisory came solely from the FBI. As House 
Committee for Homeland Security Chairman Christopher Cox stated two-weeks 
after this occurrence, "Clearly this is a very troubling development. Was it simply a 
one-time glitch or has there been a breakdown in communications between some of 
our key federal agencies?" Chairman Cox added, "Congress and the American 
people need to know, given the dangerous, uncertain times we live in today, 
cooperation among all authorities is more important than ever. We simply can't 
afford to be sending confusing messages to a nervous 
May 26,2004, On May 26,2004, Secretary Ridge appeared on five television 
news shows stating that although the prospect of a terrorist attack is significant, 
Americans should "go about living their lives and enjoying living in this country." 
At 3 p.m. that same day Attorney General Ashcroft and Federal Bureau of 
Investigation Director Mueller held a press conference and gave a warning to the 
American public. The Attorney General announced that based on "credible 
intelligence from multiple sources, A1 Qaeda intends to attack the United States in 
the next few months. This disturbing intelligence indicates A1 Qaeda's specific 
intention to hit the United States hard." Ashcroft said the intelligence - along with 
recent public statements attributed to A1 Qaeda - "suggest that it is almost ready to 
attack the United States." He fbrther stated that after the March 11 train bombings 
l 9  "Error Fear Alarms Homeland," The Boston Herald, December 22,2003. 
20 Defense Department Operational Update Briefing, December 23, 2003. 
22 "Chairman COX and Subcommittee Chairman Gibbons Concerned About Coordination of 
Terrorist Threat Advisories," Congressman Jim Gibbons Press Release, April 2004. 
in Madrid, Spain, an A1 Qaeda spokesman said the network had completed "90 
percent of preparations" to attack the United States.23 
During this press conference a reporter asked if there was credible intelligence 
suggesting the United States is going to be attacked between now and the election, 
why the threat level had not been raised. Attorney General Ashcroft responded that 
"the Homeland Security Council, led by Secretary Ridge, would make such a 
decision, and for me to try to speak for them at this time would be inappr~priate."'~ 
After Mr. Ashcroft's announcement, Mr. Ridge seemed surprised by the Attorney 
General's warning. Asked why the National Color-code alert had not been raised, Mr. 
Ridge replied "there is nothing specific enough (to raise the alert level)." 
This seemingly uncoordinated effort was followed by a response from 
Representative Christopher Cox, Chairman of the House Select Committee on 
Homeland Security. "Dissemination by our government of sensitive terrorism 
warnings must be closely coordinated across o w  intelligence and law enforcement 
communities," Cox said. "In the Homeland Security Act, DHS was assigned the 
central coordinating role in this process. The absence of Secretary Ridge from 
yesterday's news conference held by the attorney general and the FBI director, and 
the conflicting public messages their separate public appearances delivered to the 
nation, suggests that the broad and close interagency consultation we expect, and 
which the law requires, did not take place in this case." 25 
These last two examples are cited by many observers as suggesting a general 
lack of coordination and unity in message of warnings to the nation of threats, and 
also reflecting a lack of overall collaboration between DHS and other federal 
intelligence community and law enforcement organizations. Homeland Security 
employees have complained that their CIA and FBI colleagues show them little 
respect. Intelligence agents reportedly counter saying that DHS has been known to 
go public with terror alerts based on information that other agencies found to be 
sketchy.26 This latter contention does not seem to be supported by the pattern of 
Administration officials, other than the DHS Secretary, openly discussing threats to 
the Nation. 
23 Attorney General Ashcroft and FBI Director Mueller Press Conference, DoJ Media 
Advisory, May 26, 2004. 
24 Transcript, "Ashcroft, Mueller Discusses Terrorist Threat," FDCH E-Media, Wednesday, 
May 26,2004. 
25 Statement from Christopher Cox, Chairman of the House Select Committee on Homeland 
Security, May 28,2004. 
26 Michael Isikoff and Daniel Klaidman, "Look Who's Not Tallung - Still, A new report 
says U.S. intelligence agencies haven't learned to share information, despite lessons of 
911 1" Newsweek. 
0 August 1 - November 10,2004 
Sixth time threat-level raised to Orange 
On August l", 2004, Secretary of Homeland Security Ridge stated that the 
HSAS was being raised to Orange based on threat intelligence that indicated A1 
Qaeda was planning attacks against financial institutions in New York, Washington, 
D.C., and New Jersey prior to September 11, 2001. In announcing this threat level 
change, the DHS Secretary Ridge stated that the United States had new and unusually 
specific information about where a1 Qaeda would like to attack. 
The following day, Monday, August 2,2004 White House Homeland Security 
Advisor Fran Townsend similarly stated that the increase in threat level was based 
on information showing that A1 Qaeda had been surveilling financial targets in 2000 
and 2001. However, she also added that the most recent intelligence included 
mention of threats to the U.S. Capital and Members of Congress. This prompted 
Washington, D.C. Capitol Police Chief to remark that the briefings he had received 
on the recent intelligence did not speak to specific, credible, direct threats against 
Congress as an institution, or its Members. 27 Secretary Ridge did not mention the 
Capital or Congress in his statement announcing the increase in the threat level. 
However, one month later, Secretary Ridge reportedly admitted that though the 
Administration viewed the threat as "credible," the information was "sketchy and 
inc~mple te ."~~ 
On October 12, 2004, in view of the uncertainty of the intelligence that was 
presented and the subsequent announcements regarding the threat environment, 
Senator Mark Dayton temporarily closed his Washington, D.C. Office, " based upon 
that information, I have decided to close my office until after the upcoming election. 
I do so out of extreme, but necessary, precaution to protect the lives and safety of my 
Senate staff and my Minnesota constituents, who might otherwise visit my office in 
the next few weeks. I feel compelled to do so, because I will not be here in 
Washington to share in what I consider to be an unacceptably greater risk to their 
safety."29 
During this threat level change, a senior member of the White House proffered 
additional information as to the reason the threat level was raised in Washington, 
D.C. The additional information led to further confusion, producing follow-on 
statements and actions by the Washington D.C. Police Chief and a Member of 
Congress that further called into question the credibility of the originally announced 
information that led to the raising of the HSAS. 
27 "Capitol Police Chief Sees no Specific Threat to Hill; Gainer Disputes Charge by White 
House Adviser," The Washington Post, August 10,2004. 
** "Securitv Measures Buying Time Before New Plot." The Finnncinl Times. Sentember 2. 
2005 
29 Press Release, Senator Mark Dayton, October 12,2004. 
CRS- 10 
Effects of Uncoordinated or Inconsistent Threat 
Warnings 
Homeland Security Advisory System 
Given the history of these seemingly uncoordinated threat notifications, local 
governments and the public have complained about being confused by the varying 
details supporting the decision to raise the alert level. Many have lost confidence in 
the system. 
In February 2003, the Governor of Hawaii decided to keep Hawaii at the blue 
(guarded) level when the federal government raised its level to orange (high risk). 
Monetary cost of increased security and the public's psyche were figured into the 
decision as well as the potential loss of life. Ed Teixeira, vice director of the civil 
defense division of the Hawaii's Department of Defense reportedly commented that, 
"just because [Secretary of Homeland Security Tom] Ridge and [Attorney General 
John] Ashcroft go on TV and say we are on orange, it doesn't mean states and 
counties have to be at orange."30 Though a lack of information regarding place and 
timing of an attack was noted as the reason to not follow the federal government's 
recommendation regarding raising the alert level, it is equally telling that the Hawaii 
State Homeland Security advisor pointed to the Secretary of Homeland Security and 
the the Attorney General as the individuals Hawaii State officials listen to regarding 
threat warnings. 
Business leaders argued for better threat information from law enforcement, as 
well as better coordination among agencies providing threat information. 
Specifically, they said that they did not receive sufficient specific threat information, 
and frequently received threat information from multiple government agencies.31 
Some federal agencies, as well as state and local officials reported hearing about 
notification of national threat level changes from other entities, such as the FBI and 
media sources, before being notified by DHS.32 
Other Warning Advisory Problems 
There have been examples and findings that speak to the issue of coordinated 
warnings and unity of message. A significant finding of the USS Cole Commission 
acknowledged that contradictory threat levels played a role in the level of protection 
of the ship on the day of the attack.33 Similarly, the Commission on the Intelligence 
30 Pacific Business News; [http://www.bizjournals.com/pacific/stories/2003/02/24/ 
story4.html] 
31 GAO-05-33, Homeland Security: Agency Plans, Implementation, and Challenges 
Regarding the National Strategy for Homeland Security, January 12,2005. 
32 GAO Report, Homeland Security Advisory System: Preliminary Observations Regarding 
Threat Level Changes-fiom Yellow to Orange, February 26,2004, page 8. 
33 On October 12,2000, the USS Cole was attacked by a small boat laden with explosives 
while at a reheling stop in the Port of Aden, Yemen. The USS Cole at the time ofthe attack 
Capabilities of the United States regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction reported 
on the confusion associated with threat warning products destined for the President 
and senior decision makers.34 
Discussion and Options for the logth Congress 
"The American public, state and local law enforcement, governors and mayors, 
and private sector officials with responsibility for critical infrastructure all 
deserve crystal clarity when it comes to terrorism threat advisories." 
(Representative Christopher Cox (R-Calif.), Chairman of the House Select 
Committee on Homeland Security) 
A number of options exist that include clarifying DHS's primacy in alerting the 
Nation of impending threats, eliminating the Homeland Security Advisory System, 
or transferring the national threat notification responsibility to the National Counter 
Terrorism Center. 
was operating under Department of Defense threat condition Bravo, the second lowest alert 
level that denotes the current threat condition. Central Command's decision, based in part 
on the current defense threat condition, continued to use Yemen during this period as a 
refueling location despite a U.S. State Department warning against travel to Yemen on 
September 14, 1999, stating that Yemen is experiencing higher incident of hostility and 
violence toward Americans. Also, the annual State Department Patterns of Global 
Terrorism report released in April 2000, characterized Yemen as a haven for terrorists. This 
same report did not mention Djibouti; a neighboring Country that would have been available 
for refueling, as a concern for terrorist. The inconsistency between the Department of 
Defense and the Department of State warning offered conflicting information as to the level 
of threat faced by the USS Cole as it waited to be refueled off of the coast of Yemen. This 
differing analysis and lack of coordination between DOD and DOS resulted in the lack of 
recognition of the danger that the U.S.S. Cole's crew faced. 
The USS Cole Commission, in investigating the attack and making policy and 
procedure recommendations to improve the DOD's system of protecting its forces, released 
a report on January 9,2001, acknowledging contradictory threat alerting mechanisms. One 
of the recommendations stated that the geographic Commander in Chief (CINC) should have 
the sole authority for assigning the threat level for a country within his area of 
responsibility. The Commission report further recommended that the Geographic CINC's 
be solely responsible for establishing the threat level within the appropriate area of 
responsibility with input from DIA, and that the Secretary of Defense coordinate with 
Secretary of State, where possible, to minimize conflicting threat levels (being issued) from 
the Department of Defense and the Department of State. DOD, USS Cole Commission 
Report; Executive Summary, Unclassified Findings and Recommendations, January 9,200 1. 
34 "The Community's inability to implement a "one team, one fight" strategy in the terror 
war may be attributed both to ongoing bureaucratic battles between agencies charged with 
s q x x ~ & ~ l i t y  ~ O S  C U ~ ~ I : C I  tciLuiibn~ a i ~ d l b ~ l b  dLld I \ U L ~ I . ~ ~ ~ ,  * + t L E  J> ~ 1 1 ~  fall~i: of 
Community leaders to effectively resolve these disputes and clearly define agency roles and 
authorities." WMD Commission Report, Chapter 4; Finding 2, Page 288. 
CRS- 12 
Option: Clarify DHS's Primacy in Alerting the Nation of 
Impending Threats 
One issue is whether the intent of section 20 1 d735 ofthe Homeland Security Act 
of 2002 was to give DHS explicit authority and responsibility to be the sole federal 
entity charged with conveying homeland security threat information to the American 
people. In delivering to Congress the proposed legislation to create the Department 
of Homeland Security, President Bush recommended that "one department 
coordinate communication with State and local governments, private industry, and 
the American people about threats and preparedne~s."~~ Sectionl02(c)(3) of the 
Homeland Security Act also states that the Secretary of Homeland Security has the 
authority and responsibility for "distributing or, as appropriate, coordinating the 
distribution of warnings and information to State and local government personnel, 
agencies, and authorities and to the public." Congress could reemphasize DHS' 
primacy in alerting the Nation of impending threats. This might put other Agency 
officials on notice as to whom is authorized to be the public face of national threat 
notifications. Another option would be to allow other Departments to disseminate 
threat information regarding the security of the homeland when such information is 
deemed credible and extremely time-sensitive (exigent circumstances). 
Option: Eliminate the Homeland Security Advisory System 
Given the short history of the HSAS, uncoordinated warning efforts, lack of 
uniformity in the type of information conveyed, and an increasingly wary populace 
as to the credibility of the message, Congress could choose to eliminate the system. 
The natural question that follows is what would the replacement system be and 
would it be an improvement on the current system. 
One could argue that, given the uniqueness of each threat situation requiring a 
communication to the public, threat notifications may not allow for a system per se. 
According to this line of reasoning, each "warning-notice" should be handled as its 
own entity. Threat information, geographic location, target location, timing of 
perceived attack, defensive measures, and the like should be addressed individually 
and not formulated to fit into a neat category of threat-levels. This might be 
problematic for a number of reasons. First, many federal and state programs are tied 
to the current color-code with numerous actions and funding decisions tied to a 
raising or lowering of the alert. Secondly, though cumbersome and non-specific, the 
current HSAS allows for an assessment, by federal and state governments, the private 
35 HSA2002; Sect 201d 7. The Under Secretary of IAIP, subject to the direction and control 
of the Secretary (of Homeland Security), shall administer the Homeland Security Advisory 
System (HSAS), including ( I )  exercising primary responsibility for public advisories related 
to threat to homeland security (2) in coordination with other agencies of the Federal 
Government, provide specific warning information to State and local government agencies 
and authorities, the private sector, other entities, and the public. 
36 Message to the Congress; Transmittal of proposed legislation to created the Department 
of Homeland Security, June 18,2002. [http:llwww.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2OO2/ 
O6/2OO2O6 18-5 .htrnl]. 
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sector, and the public as to a general threat level that comes with certain expectations 
regarding the federal response. Lastly, if a warning-notice type system were 
introduced, the inevitable question would arise regarding how one compares today's 
threat warning to past color-coded warnings and other warning-notices. 
Option: Transfer the Threat Notification Responsibility to the 
National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC) 
As stated in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, a 
mission of the National Counter Terrorism Center is to serve as the primary 
organization for analyzing and integrating all intelligence possessed or acquired by 
the United States Government pertaining to terrorism and counter terrorism (except 
intelligence pertaining exclusively to domestic terrorists and domestic counter 
terrorism) and to serve as the central and shared knowledge bank on known and 
suspected terrorists and international terror groups, as well as their goals, strategies, 
capabilities, and networks of contacts and s~pport .~ '  
Since the relevant Departments concerned with terrorism are represented at the 
NCTC and 1egislativelyNCTC is the focal point of all federal analytical and strategic 
operational planning terrorism efforts, this entity may be well positioned to review 
all applicable information regarding the terrorist threat and also coordinate the 
warning message to be conveyed to the public. One option would be to designate the 
NCTC the federal government's communicator of threat information to the Nation. 
Precedence exists for this option as Secretary Ridge and the Director of the NCTC 
(formerly the Terrorist Threat Integration Center) held a joint press conference 
discussing the threat environment and suggested protective measures.38 Formalizing 
the NCTC as the national threat messenger would allow Congress to hold one 
organization (NCTC) responsible for terrorism analysis and the warnings that are 
derived therein. DHS could continue to provide specific advice regarding protective 
measures to the private sector, state and local governments, and the public. However, 
the advice and collaborative efforts would be based on threat information compiled 
and communicated by the NCTC. Congress could include language to allow for 
other Departments to disseminate threat information under exigent circumstances. 
Whether the threat notification process continues in the current form of the 
HSAS, is eliminated and replaced by situation specific warning-notices, or is 
transferred to the NCTC or some other entity, the issue remains one of coordination 
and unity of message, rather than in what form the threat information should be 
conveyed. Undoubtedly, numerous government agencies will continue to comment 
on various aspects of a given threat condition. However, critics argue that future 
national threat announcements should occur in a coordinated manner that allows for 
an unambiguous message. Due to a lack of coordination and unity in message it 
appears that the general public and affected localities are becoming desensitized or 
disinterested in the information contained in national threat warning notification 
messages. The lack of confidence brought on by confusion in the current notification 
process could be a severe liability in an actual emergency. 
37 P.L. 108-458; Section 119, 3(d)(l)and (6). 
38 "Feds Decide Against Raising Terror Alert"; Fox News, October 20, 2004, 
[http:/lwww.foxnews.comlstory/0,2933,137 160,00.html] 
